Russia’s de-facto war on Ukraine has drawn the world’s attention. Largely unnoticed, however, is a concurrent transformation in relations between Cairo and Moscow.
The Russian long-standing love affair with the Syrian Assad family dictatorship is well known. However, many have forgotten that from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, Moscow was Cairo’s sugar daddy.
Historically, Russo-Egyptian relations have been tumultuous. But a new chapter began during the Sochi Olympics when Egypt’s Defense Minister (and likely presidential candidate) Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmi visited the Kremlin and met with their Russian counterparts as well as with President Vladimir Putin.
The Egyptians came away with quite a bit from those meetings, including a $3 billion preliminary agreement to purchase fighter jets, air defense systems, helicopters and other materiel. El-Sisi and his Russian counterpart discussed holding joint military exercises and training Egyptian officers in Russian military academies.
And there’s more. Putin declared his support of el-Sisi’s expected run for the presidency. Russia plans to invest in an industrial technology park near Alexandria and in Egyptian energy projects, including nuclear power generation. And both nations agreed to hold further bilateral talks in Moscow.
All this points to a rapprochement that would return Egypt to its closest cooperation with Russia since 1972, when Anwar Sadat expelled 20,000 Soviet military experts from Egypt and reoriented his country toward Washington.
Why the turn to Moscow?
Because Washington has largely turned its back on Cairo since Egypt’s military leaders ousted President Mohammed Morsi last July and began cracking down on his Muslim Brotherhood.
Before the coup, the U.S. provided Egypt with $1.5 billion in aid annually. But the Obama administration responded to Morsi’s ouster by cutting $260 million in financial assistance and $300 million in loan guarantees. Additionally, the U.S. suspended scheduled deliveries of F-16 fighters, AH-64 helicopters, M-1/A-1 tanks and Harpoon missiles.
Now, Egypt’s military leaders are seeking partner countries who share their dislike of the global Islamist organization. Russia fits the bill. Like Egypt, it has declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization.
So, too, has Saudi Arabia. It and other rich Arab countries are supporting el-Sisi economically. Meanwhile, Russia is more than glad to sell him modern weapons.
As a result, the geopolitical pendulum in the Middle East has swung again—to America’s detriment.
Moscow is thinking geopolitically and strategically. Though its Soviet power is long gone, Russia is seeking to recreate the strong naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea that it had enjoyed for more than two centuries before the collapse of the U.S.S.R.
Last year, top Egyptian officials met with Russia’s military intelligence chief in Cairo. And for the first time since 1992, a Russian warship docked in Egypt. These visits signal a revival of military and intelligence cooperation between Egypt and Russia, which poses a challenge to U.S. leadership in the region.
The trip to Moscow was el-Sisi’s first trip abroad since Morsi’s ouster. His choice of destination was meant to signal Washington that its influence over Egypt is finite, and that if Washington tries to put pressure on Cairo, there is another country that Egypt can turn to.
That’s not to say there will be a complete reorientation of Cairo toward Moscow, as occurred during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s presidency in the 1960s. Residual ties to the United States are too strong for that.
For example, the U.S. continues to provide some assistance, including replacement parts for military platforms. And many Egyptian military officers, including el-Sisi himself, have been educated in American universities.
Still, as Egypt pulls away from the U.S., it lays the ground for a greater Russian presence in the region, and that is not a good thing. It may enable the growing Iranian penetration and disruption of America’s maritime presence and international trade routes.
Sooner or later, the United States will recognize the strategic value of the Mediterranean Sea, especially that of the Eastern Med and the Suez Canal. At that point, Washington will have to work with Cairo to repair, maintain and expand its political and military ties. U.S.-Egyptian relations may have frayed, but they can be repaired.
It is in the U.S. interest to keep relations with Egypt on an even keel. Ignoring the reality of Russian geopolitical appetites is not a good strategy.
